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SEARCH WARRANTS, MOTIONS TO
SUPPRESS AND "LOST CASES:" THE
EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
IN SEVEN JURISDICTIONS*
CRAIG D. UCHIDA** AND TIMOTHY S. BYNUM***
I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies that examine the effects of the exclusionary
rule on search warrant cases are few and far between. Only a hand-
ful of researchers have studied the use of search warrants by law
enforcement officers, and even fewer have looked systematically at
the effects of the exclusionary sanction on their use.
Search warrants have become an important tool in law enforce-
ment efforts to curtail illegal drug trafficking. During the late 1980s,
a number of police agencies have increased their use of warrants.
For example, Minneapolis narcotics detectives executed 123 war-
rants in 1987, 383 in 1988 and 425 in 1989. In San Diego, "crack
abatement" detectives executed 143 warrants in 1989, compared to
67 in the previous year. In Denver, a "crack" task force of sixteen
detectives executed 246 search warrants in 1988 and 350 in 1989.1
However, little is known about the results of these warrants gener-
ally, in terms of arrests, prosecutions, motions to suppress, or "lost
cases" due to the exclusionary sanction.
Questions about the effectiveness and necessity of the exclu-
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sionary rule continue to be raised outside scholarly circles and po-
lice agencies. Members of Congress continue to express interest in
the rule-some wish to broaden its exceptions, while others try to
maintain the status quo. Congressional interest is particularly evi-
dent in the "good faith exception, ' 2 as both the House and Senate
recently debated whether to expand the good faith notion to war-
rantless situations.3 The United States Supreme Court continues to
rule on fourth amendment cases as well.
4
The use of search warrants and the exclusionary rule intersect
when, during pretrial proceedings and courtroom arguments, mo-
tions to suppress evidence are raised to challenge both the methods
and the results of searches conducted by police. Additionally, ques-
tions about a search's appropriateness are sometimes raised by de-
fense counsel. At times, judges sustain these motions, but we do
not know with precision how often and under what circumstances
those rulings are made.
Given these compelling interests, the primary focus of this Arti-
cle is to analyze systematically the effects of the exclusionary sanc-
tion on cases that emerge through search warrant applications. We
examine the following research questions: Under what situations
and circumstances are search warrants used? What are the out-
comes? How often are motions to suppress physical evidence made
by defendants? What is the success rate of the motions and what are
the outcomes? To address these questions, we use data from 2,115
search warrant applications and interviews with 187 individuals
from seven major criminal justice systems across the country. More
specifically, to determine the effects of the exclusionary rule on
search warrant-based cases, we examine and discuss the number of
2 Debate over the definition and interpretation of the "good faith" exception has
been as heated as debate over the exclusionary rule itself. For the most part, however,
the good faith exception means that evidence obtained with a reasonable or good faith
belief that the challenged search or seizure was consistent with the fourth amendment
should not be excluded. For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 40-41 and ac-
companying text.
3 In October 1990, the House of Representatives approved a resolution that broad-
ened the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to cover warrantless searches as
well as searches in which warrants are used. However, because a compromise could not
be reached with the Senate, the exception was not included in the omnibus crime bill for
fiscal year 1991. DRUG ENFORCEMENr REPORT, Oct. 30, 1990, at 1.
4 Recent Supreme Court decisions on fourth amendment issues include United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (fourth amendment not applicable
to search by United States authorities in Mexico); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093
(1990) (fourth amendment permitted limited "protective sweep" in conjunction with in-
home arrest); and Smith v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1288 (1990) (warrantless search of suspect's
bag not justified as search incident to lawful arrest).
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arrestees, defendants, and "lost cases" as a result of successful mo-
tions to suppress evidence because of search and seizure problems.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The fourth amendment guarantees the protection of individuals
against unreasonable search and seizure. 5 These constitutional pro-
tections have traditionally been assured through the exercise of the
exclusionary rule. Since the 1914 Supreme Court decision in Weeks
v. United States,6 evidence ruled to be seized in violation of the fourth
amendment has been excluded from use in criminal prosecution in
federal cases.
In 1949, the Supreme Court, in Wolfv. Colorado,7 declared that
the fourth amendment binds state and local law enforcement of-
ficers through the due process clause.8 Despite the rationale of
Weeks, however, the Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule
to the states, thus leaving the states to fashion for themselves reme-
dies for violations of the rule.9 However, only twelve years later, in
Mapp v. Ohio,10 the Court overruled Wolf and extended the exclu-
sionary rule to the states. In so ruling, the Court took into account:
(1) the "imperative ofjudicial integrity;"' 1 (2) a trend among states
following Wolf to adopt the Weeks rule on the grounds that alterna-
tive remedies were inadequate;12 (3) an assumption that states that
admit illegally seized evidence encourage fourth amendment viola-
tions;1 3 and (4) the absence of evidence, based on both the experi-
ence of the United States under Weeks and the states who voluntarily
adopted Weeks, that the exclusionary rule impaired the effectiveness
of law enforcement.14
5 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
6 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8 Id. at 27-28.
9 Several factors underlay the Court's decision in Wolf. First, the Court deferred to
the principles of federalism. Id. at 28. Second, the Court believed that the rule ex-
cluded logically relevant evidence. Id. Third, 30 states had refused to extend Weeks to
fourth amendment violations by state law enforcement officers, while only 17 had done
so. Id. at 29. Finally, a number of alternative remedies to the rule were available in
those states rejecting Weeks-remedies that, in the Court's view, were "equally effective"
in discouraging fourth amendment violations "if consistently enforced." Id. at 31.
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
12 The Court observed that "[w]hile in 1949, prior to the Wolfcase, almost two-thirds
of the states were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now despite the Wolfcase,
more than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial deci-
sion, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule." 367 U.S. at 651.
13 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217).
14 Id. at 659-60.
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Over the past thirty years, the appropriate application of the
exclusionary rule and its rationale have been vigorously debated.
Critics of the exclusionary rule maintain that its application has
been too rigid and that substantial modifications are in order.1 5
The critics believe that continuing court interpretations of the ex-
clusionary rule have become increasingly complex and confusing.
They further argue that the rule works to preserve the fourth
amendment's guarantees only by imposing a high cost on society;
specifically, by depriving the courts of reliable, and often direct evi-
dence, a criminal is freed. Finally, they argue that there are few ben-
efits to the rule: it assists those accused of crimes but does not deter
police from unconstitutional conduct.
In contrast, proponents of the rule continue to argue that its
preservation is essential to the protection of due process and indi-
vidual rights. 16 Furthermore, they argue that evidence tends to
show that exclusion does have a deterrent effect. Supporters point
to the dramatic increase in the number of search warrants issued in
the years after the Mapp decision as evidence of the tremendous im-
pact that the Court's decision has had on police practices. Finally,
they argue that police departments have increased the amount of
training provided to their officers on how to comply with fourth
amendment rulings.
Since the Mapp decision, the Supreme Court has continued to
operationalize the exclusionary rule through a series of cases speci-
fying the conditions and situations in which the rule does and does
not apply. As Mertens and Wasserstrom point out, "exclusionary
rule litigation provides the principal occasion for the articulation of
fourth amendment standards. Without such litigation, it is unlikely
that many of these fourth amendment issues would have been re-
solved."'17 The Court has carved out exceptions to the rule with re-
gard to searches conducted incident to arrest,' 8 in hot pursuit,19 and
15 See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977); M. WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY ALTER-
NATIVES TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1982); and Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith Restate-
ment of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916 (1982).
16 See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a 'Principled Basis"
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983); LaFave, The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect Worldk On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U.
PrIT. L. REv. 307 (1982); and Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, 1 CRim.
JUST. ETHICS 28 (1982).
17 Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulat-
ing the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. Lj. 365, 402 (1981).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969).
19 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
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seizure of items in plain view.20 The Court has also refined the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule in grand jury and habeas corpus
proceedings. 2' Additional decisions have further refined the search
warrant procedure when informants are used. 22
Since Mapp, the rationale for the rule has changed direction. In
Alderman v. United States,23 the Court, for the first time, suggested
that the determination of whether to apply the exclusionary rule
would turn on a balancing of the costs and benefits of exclusion.
Justice White, writing for the majority, said:
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose
rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to jus-
tify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case
against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that
judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify fur-
ther encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those ac-
cused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of
all the evidence which exposes the truth.
2 4
The Court's decision in United States v. Calandra25 further
20 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
21 In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974), the Court declared that
the exclusionary rule did not apply to the presentation of illegally obtained evidence at
grand jury proceedings. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1977), the Court an-
nounced that state prisoners who had allegedly been convicted and imprisoned on ille-
gally obtained evidence could no longer pursue their constitutional rights through the
use of habeas corpus.
22 In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983), the Court abandoned the "two-
pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969). The "two-pronged" test required officers to establish either that
their informant was credible (i.e., generally trustworthy) or that the information was reli-
able (the "veracity" prong) and that the informer obtained the information in a reliable
way ("the basis of knowledge" prong). In its place, the Gates Court adopted the "totality
of the circumstances" standard to decide whether probable cause existed to issue a
search warrant based on information provided by confidential or anonymous infor-
mants. Under the totality of circumstances approach,
the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense deci-
sion, whether given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, in-
cluding the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
23 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The Court ruled that defendants whose fourth amendment
rights were not violated lacked standing to move to suppress evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment rights of others. Id. at 171.
24 Id. at 174-75.
25 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Both Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debae over the Exclusion-
ary Rule: A Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 559 (1982), and Nardulli,
The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 3 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J.
585 (1983), have commented that the Burger Court believed that the principal rationale
for the rule was its value in deterring the police from the type of illegal behavior in
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changed the basis for the exclusionary rule. In Calandra, the Court
concluded that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved." 26 Thus, the Court articulated that the exclusionary rule
was not a right conferred by the fourth amendment, but rather a
remedy to effectuate fourth amendment rights. In addition, the Ca-
landra Court all but abandoned the other bases for exclusion, em-
phasizing that the "rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures." 27 The
Court thus weighed the costs of exclusion in a particular context-
the loss of highly probative evidence-against the likely benefits of
exclusion-an increased deterrence of unlawful police behavior.
In subsequent cases, the Court has applied this cost-bene-
fit/deterrence analysis to refuse to extend the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule. In United States v. Janis,28 the Court concluded that the
rule's deterrent purpose would not be served by excluding evidence
illegally seized by a state police officer from a federal civil tax pro-
ceeding. Similarly, in Stone v. Powell,29 the Court held that where a
state has provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate a fourth
amendment claim, a state prisoner may not receive federal habeas
corpus relief on the basis that illegally obtained evidence was intro-
duced at his or her trial. In Powell, the Court further limited the
"judicial integrity" justification for the exclusionary rule: "While
courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integ-
rity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as ajustifi-
cation for the exclusion of highly probative evidence." 30 Finally, in
Calandra. Furthermore, Canon noted that "[bly portraying the rule as a pragmatic social
policy rather than a basic constitutional principle, its critics have shifted the scope of the
debate from arguments about constitutional law and judicial integrity (where they lost)
to arguments about the empirical data." Canon, this note, at 563. Potter Stewart has
claimed that Calandra was "perhaps the most significant post-Mapp decision on the scope
of the exclusionary rule." Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond- The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLuM. L. REv.
1365, 1390 (1983).
26 414 U.S. at 348. Commentators have pointed out that "the Court ruled that the
accused has no personal constitutional right to have unlawfully-seized evidence ex-
cluded at trial. Therefore, because the Court commits no constitutional violation by
admitting illegally seized evidence, judicial integrity comes into play only when the
Court "encourages" constitutional violations." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 17,
at 386 n.100.
27 414 U.S. at 349-52.
28 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
29 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
30 Id. at 485.
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United States v. Havens,3' the Court held that illegally obtained evi-
dence could be used to impeach the testimony of the victim of the
illegal search on the ground that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule was adequately served by excluding the evidence from the case-
in-chief.3
2
In United States v. Leon,33 Massachusetts v. Sheppard,34 and Illinois v.
Krull,35 the Supreme Court applied the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. In Leon and Sheppard, the Court permitted the ad-
mission of evidence secured through a search warrant even though
the search warrant was faulty. The Court ruled that the officers who
obtained the warrants had done so in "good faith," and thus the
exclusionary rule should not apply.3 6 Writing for the majority in
Leon, Justice White first justified the Court's holding by concluding
that the exclusionary rule was neither a "necessary corollary of the
Fourth Amendment" nor "required by the conjunction of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments."3 7 Justice White then weighed the
costs and benefits of preventing the use of "inherently trustworthy
tangible evidence." On the costs-side of the equation, the Court
referred to the "substantial social costs of the exclusionary rule in
terms of its interference with the criminal justice system's truth-find-
ing function" and the result that "some guilty defendants may go
free or receive reduced sentences." 38 On the benefits-side, the
Court considered the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and
found that it was "marginal or nonexistent in cases where evidence
was obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant . . .39
In Illinois v. Krull,40 the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule
did not apply to evidence seized during a warrantless search where
the police conducted the search pursuant to, and with good faith
reliance upon, a statute that authorized the warrantless administra-
tive search, but which was later held unconstitutional. Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, again used the cost-benefit rationale
coupled with the deterrence argument as the basis for the decision.
He wrote,
31 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980).
32 Id. at 627-28.
33 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
34 468 U.S. 981 (1984). Sheppard is the companion case of Leon.
35 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
36 Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
37 Id. at 906.
38 Id. at 907.
39 Id. at 922.
40 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
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Application of the exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to
those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively ad-
vanced .... The Court has examined whether the rule's deterrent ef-
fect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such
deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from
the truth-seeking process.
4 1
By employing a cost-benefit approach, the Burger and Rehn-
quist Courts have not only changed the focus of their holdings on
the exclusionary rule, but have also changed the focus of empirical
research. The following sections take a closer look at the prior re-
search in this area. We begin by focusing on studies that examine
the impact of the exclusionary rule, and then discuss the research
that analyzes the costs and benefits of the exclusionary sanction.
Thereafter, we consider the importance of this Article within the
context of search warrants and the exclusionary rule.
III. PRIOR RESEARCH
A. THE IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The focus of early research concerned the impact of the Mapp
decision. Of specific interest in these studies was the implementa-
tion of search warrant procedures, the degree of compliance with
the provisions of the Mapp decision, and the impact of the rule on
case dispositions.
Columbia University Law School students provided the first
empirical assessment of the effect of the exclusionary rule.42 Specifi-
cally, they were interested in determining whether the Mapp deci-
sion altered police search and seizure practices. Using a before-
after research design, the students examined the frequency of New
York City misdemeanor narcotics offenses.
The authors expected to observe a change in the case disposi-
tion and frequency of arrest for narcotics in the post-Mapp period.
Their data showed that the number of post-Mapp arrests declined by
fifty percent for detectives in the Narcotics Bureau, but increased for
arrests by uniformed officers and other detectives. The authors
could not find a clear explanation for the differences within the po-
lice department. They could only speculate that the character of the
Narcotics Bureau's duties differed from patrol or plainclothes of-
ficers.43 Overall, although police practices did not change substan-
tially as a result of Mapp, the authors suggested that the situation
41 Id. at 347.
42 Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases,
4 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROBs. 87 (1968).
43 That is, the authors attributed the decrease in arrests to the specialized nature of
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improved after Mapp because search and seizure practices were
more strictly controlled. 44
A broader effort to assess the deterrent effect of the exclusion-
ary rule was conducted by Dallin Oaks, 45 who analyzed misde-
meanor and felony arrests and convictions in Cincinnati, Chicago,
and Washington, D.C. He determined that the exclusionary rule
was applicable primarily in certain types of cases, particularly those
involving narcotics, weapons, and gambling offenses. Oaks com-
piled arrest statistics from Cincinnati for the 1956-67 period and
concluded that the imposition of the exclusionary rule in 1961 had
virtually no effect on the propensity of the police to make arrests for
narcotics and weapons offenses, though he conceded that the
number of gambling arrests were affected. Oaks found differences
between Chicago and Washington, D.C., in the proportion of cases
where motions to suppress evidence due to search and seizure
problems were brought (40% versus 16%, respectively); in the per-
cent of motions granted (87% versus 20%); and in the percent of
cases where a successful motion resulted in dismissal of the case
(100% versus 50%). The primary reason for these differences was
the more rigorous screening of cases in Washington, D.C. Oaks
concluded that the filing of motions was not indicative of the actual
impact of the exclusionary rule on case dispositions. He suggested,
however, that these figures show that the rule had no deterrent ef-
fect on police practices; the data indicated that illegal search and
seizures occurred quite frequently despite the rule.
Following in Oaks' footsteps, James E. Spiotto46 studied mo-
tions to suppress to determine the impact of the exclusionary rule
the narcotics bureau, the "close-knit" character of the bureau, and the nature of the
narcotics offenses themselves.
44 To assess the effect of Mapp on narcotics case dispositions, the authors examined
court records for guilty pleas, dismissals, and motions to suppress evidence. In general,
the authors found "the data indicate that defendants have fared better since Mapp."
Comment, supra note 42, at 96. A sharp decrease occurred in guilty pleas, while in-
creases occurred in successful motions to suppress and in "dismissals without explana-
tion." These patterns led the authors to conclude that the changes since Mapp showed
"the beneficial effects of greater respect for the civil liberties of criminal defendants ...
and represented a new obstacle to effective enforcement of narcotics laws." Id.
45 Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665
(1970).
46 Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alterna-
tives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). Thomas Y. Davies, who critiqued Spiotto's work,
noted that "in many respects James E. Spiotto's work was a continuation of that begun
by Oaks." Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A
Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 740, 741
(1974). Davies pointed out that Spiotto used the Oaks data set from Chicago, that they
worked together, and that both received grants from the Department of Justice.
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on case processing over a twenty-year period. Using data from the
Chicago courts, Spiotto argued that the best measurement of the
impact of the exclusionary rule on police behavior was to observe
the frequency of motions made before and after the introduction of
the rule. If the rule had an apparent impact, he reasoned, then one
would expect a decrease in the number of motions to suppress. 4
7
The results indicated a significant increase in motions to suppress
for narcotics and weapons offenses, though gambling offenses ex-
perienced a substantial decline. A more important finding was that
seventy-eight percent of the defendants who made a motion to sup-
press had a criminal record. Spiotto concluded that the rule had no
deterrent effect on illegal search practices and that it exacted a high
societal cost by freeing dangerous or guilty criminals.
Soon after Spiotto's work appeared, however, a critique written
by Thomas Y. Davies warned that Spiotto's results should be viewed
with caution for a variety of reasons.48 First, the data were collected
in a "haphazard fashion" and interpreted selectively. 49 Second, the
research design contained a "critical" mistake regarding the date of
the rule's introduction in Chicago: Illinois adopted the exclusionary
rule in 1923, thirty-eight years prior to Mapp, not during the 1950-
70 period that Spiotto claimed.50 Third, Davies criticized the use of
motions to suppress as valid indicators of illegal searches for the
type of research question posed by Spiotto. Specifically, Davies ar-
gued that
[mlotions to suppress cannot be used because they do not measure
illegal searches prior to the introduction of the exclusionary rule.
Although a form of the motion to suppress existed prior to the advent
of the rule, the scope of cases where a motion to suppress could be
raised increased dramatically following the introduction of the rule.51
Given his careful review of the data, Davies warned that "Spiotto's
research.., does not demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the exclu-
47 In his analysis, Spiotto employed four different measures: (1) the number of de-
fendants appearing in court; (2) the percentage of those defendants making motions; (3)
percentage granted; and (4) the percentage of defendants with granted motions. Spi-
otto used data from 1950, 1969, and 1971 in Chicago, and focused on gambling, narcot-
ics and weapons charges.
48 Critique, supra note 46, at 762.
49 Spiotto failed to control for population trends and increases in crime rates. Dur-
ing the twenty-year span of the study, tie crime trends drastically increased, resulting in
an increased number of motions to suppress.
50 Clearly, this is an important error, for without data from the period prior to the
implementation of the exclusionary rule, one cannot make inferences about its impact,
particularly as Spiotto suggests.




In 1974, Bradley Canon reached different conclusions than Spi-
otto in his analysis of arrests, issued search warrants, changes in
search and seizure policies, and successful motions to suppress evi-
dence.53 Canon found that changes in search and seizure practices
could be attributed to Mapp and demonstrated that police compli-
ance with search warrant procedures increased significantly between
1967 and 1973. He concluded that the exclusionary rule was more
effective at the time of his study (1974) than it was shortly after the
Mapp decision in 1961.
B. THE COST OF EXCLUSION
More recently, the focus of research on the exclusionary rule
has shifted to its "cost" in terms of lost cases. Because the Supreme
Court changed its exclusionary rule rationale in 1974,54 researchers
began to shift their emphasis to cost-benefit analyses and an exami-
nation of the deterrent effects of the rule. This change in emphasis
is exemplified by research conducted by the General Accounting Of-
fice,5 5 the National Institute of Justice,5 6 Nardulli,5 7 Davies,58 and
Orfield.5 9
The General Accounting Office study focused upon exclusion
of cases in federal courts through declinations by United States At-
torneys' Offices. 60 The GAO Report found that:
Of the 2,804 cases analyzed during the period July I through August
52 Id. at 763.
53 Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a
Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. LJ. 681 (1974). Canon collected crime data from 14 cities,
sent questionnaires pertaining to search and seizure practices to police departments,
prosecutors, and public defenders in over 130 cities, and interviewed police, prosecu-
tors, and public defenders in 10 cities.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 25 to 41.
55 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TIONS (1979) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
56 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A
STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1982) [hereinafter NIJ REPORT].
57 Nardulli, supra note 25.
58 Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
611 (1983).
59 Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics
Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016 (1987).
60 GAO REPORT, supra note 55. The GAO received data from a national, stratified
sample of 42 United States Attorney's Offices. Using the individual defendant as the
sampling unit, cases were drawn from the period July 1 through August 31, 1978. In
addition, questionnaires were sent to personnel in United States Attorneys Offices re-
sponsible for the cases to determine the role of the fourth amendment in decisions to
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31, 1978, 16% of the defendants whose cases were accepted for prose-
cution filed some type of suppression motion, 11% cited the fourth
amendment. However, only 0.4% of declined defendants' cases were
declined due to fourth amendment search and seizure problems.
6 1
In addition, the study found that successful motions were made in
only 1.3%o of prosecuted cases. Thus, the report concluded that the
exclusionary rule had a minimal impact.
In contrast, three years later, an in-house research study con-
ducted by the National Institute ofJustice (Nih) found that the rule
had a major impact on the disposition of felony arrests. 62 A princi-
pal finding from this analysis indicated that 4.8%o of all felony ar-
rests rejected for prosecution were rejected because of search and
seizure problems. In addition, 32.5% of all felony arrests for nar-
cotics offenses were rejected for prosecution in one of the Los An-
geles County District Attorney's Offices due to search problems,
and 29% of similar cases were rejected in the other office studied.
The NIJ Report also noted that about one-half of those defendants
freed because of the exclusionary rule were subsequently arrested
within two years of their release. The study concluded that the ex-
clusionary rule is a major factor in the processing of felony cases
and implied that it exacts a significant cost to the justice system in
terms of lost arrests and cases.
Davies re-analyzed the NIJ data and reached different conclu-
sions.63 Davies severely criticized the NIJ study because it "suffers
from inappropriate samples, from the omission of readily available
prosecute or not, the frequency of motions to suppress, and the impact of fourth amend-
ment motions on criminal justice system resources and the disposition of defendants.
61 Id. at 1.
62 NIJ REPORT, supra note 56. In this analysis, the authors examined all California
felony arrests that were rejected for prosecution for search and seizure problems be-
tween 1976 and 1979; all felony cases rejected in San Diego County in 1980; and a
sample of cases rejected in two branches of the Los Angeles County District Attorney's
Office. The authors also examined the prior and subsequent criminal activity of the
defendants whose cases were excluded.
63 Davies, supra note 58, at 611. Davies contested two major findings of the NIJ Re-
port: (1) that 4.8% of arrests rejected by prosecutors were rejected because of illegal
searches; and (2) that 30% of drug arrests were rejected by prosecutors because of ille-
gal searches. In his re-analysis, Davies used a different baseline than the NIJ Report to
determine the percentage of "lost arrests." The NIJ Report calculated that 4.8% of the
declined cases (4,130 arrests rejected divided by 86,033 declined by prosecutors) were
rejected because of the exclusionary rule. Davies found that only 0.8% (4,130 arrests
rejected divided by 520,993 total arrests) of felony arrests were declined because of
illegal search problems.
The NIJ Report estimated that 30% of drug arrests were rejected in California,
based on data from two local prosecutor's offices in the Los Angeles area. Davies con-
tends that the number of arrests (114 in one jurisdiction and 145 in another) was too
small to represent a general estimate of the effects of the exclusionary rule in drug ar-
rests. Davies used statewide data from the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics to
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and highly pertinent data, and from a variety of analytical choices
that produce a slanted interpretation of the data." 64 In his reanal-
ysis, Davies found that prosecutors rejected only 0.8% of felony ar-
rests because of illegal searches. Davies' reassessment also
discovered that in felony drug arrests, the prosecutors rejected
2.4% of the arrests (not 30% as suggested by the NIJ study), the
rejection rate for non-drug arrests was less than 0.3%, and the rate
was even lower for violent crimes.65 In addition, Davies found that
by looking at the cumulative effect of the rule through all stages of
the felony process in California, "only about 2.35% of felony arrests
are lost because of illegal searches" and "[this estimate] is almost
certainly somewhat inflated." 66 Finally, he concluded that available
data showed that the cost of the exclusionary rule was marginal, es-
pecially in view of the ambiguous nature of the lost arrests.
Recent studies tend to agree with Davies' conclusions. Peter F.
Nardulli's examination of the filing and outcomes of motions to sup-
press provided similar evidence that the rule exacted only marginal
societal costs. 67 In his nine-county study of 7,500 felony court cases
in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, Nardulli analyzed the inci-
dence of motions to suppress physical evidence, and for compara-
tive purposes, motions to suppress confessions and identifications.
The results showed that motions to suppress physical evidence were
filed in less than 5% of all felony cases. Further, he noted that the
success rate of such motions was quite marginal (only 0.69% of
cases filed). Even when motions to suppress were successful, a
number of defendants were still convicted without the excluded evi-
dence. Nardulli concluded that the "cost" of the exclusionary rule
was quite minimal in that less than 0.6% of all cases were lost due to
the exclusion of evidence, and that most of these cases involved mi-
nor offenses and offenders.
Finally, one recent study concentrated solely on the deterrence
rationale. Myron W. Orfield, Jr.,68 interviewed narcotics detectives
in Chicago and found that the exclusionary rule had "significant de-
terrent effects . .. [it] changed police, prosecutorial, and judicial
procedures.., it educated police officers in the requirements of the
fourth amendment and punished them when they violated those
show that only 2.3% of drug arrests were rejected by prosecutors because of illegal
searches over a five-year period.
64 Id. at 619.
65 Id. at 679-80.
66 Id. at 655.
67 Nardulli, supra note 25.




These empirical studies have proven to be important in the on-
going debate over the exclusionary rule. Both proponents and op-
ponents of the rule, as well as members of the Supreme Court, have
used these data in various ways.70 Questions remain unanswered,
however, particularly when we turn to the costs of exclusion using
search warrants. In the next section, we briefly examine two prior
studies of warrants that have a direct bearing on the current Article.
C. SEARCH WARRANT STUDIES
Richard Van Duizend and his colleagues at the National Center
for State Courts71 examined the search warrant process in seven cit-
ies across the country, and both dispelled and confirmed a number
of myths associated with that process. For example, the researchers
found that (1) search warrants were sought in relatively few cases;
(2) warrants were diverse in their types of cases; (3) judge-shopping
occurred by some law enforcement applicants; (4) warrant applica-
tions were rarely rejected by judges or magistrates; and (5) warrant
applications were often based on unsworn hearsay from anonymous
informants.
The study also attempted to determine whether issued warrants
would be the subject of successful motions to suppress, and thus,
constitute "lost" prosecutions. Examining 350 cases that resulted
from issued warrants, the study reported that motions to suppress
'were filed in 40% of the cases, but only 5% (seventeen) of those
motions were granted either fully or in part. Of particular impor-
tance was the finding that twelve of these seventeen cases still re-
sulted in a conviction. The study concluded that search warrants
69 Id. at 1017. Orfield based his study on one research question based on Calandra
and three other court cases: Does the exclusionary rule deter unlawful police behavior?
To answer this question, Orfield interviewed 26 Chicago narcotics officers in 1986 using
a structured questionnaire. Questions were asked of officers regarding their views on
training, experiences in court, their opinions of the exclusionary rule, and how it affects
their work.
70 For example, in United States v.Janis, after reviewing the various empirical studies
of the rule's deterrent effects and criticisms of those studies, Justice Blackmun, writing
for the Court, wrote: "The final conclusion is dear. No empirical researcher, propo-
nent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether
the rule has a deterrent effect." 428 U.S. 433, 450 n.22 (1976)
Additionally, Davies reported that the Solicitor General's Amicus Curiae Brief for
the United States in Illinois v. Gates cited the GAO Report and the NIJ Report. Davies,
supra note 58, at 615. Justice White, concurring in Gates, adopted the NIJ Report's find-
ings. 462 U.S. at 257 n.13 (White, J., concurring).
71 R. VAN DUIZEND, L. SuTrON & C. CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES (1986).
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properly administered and supervised . . . can protect privacy and
property rights without significantly interfering with the ability of po-
lice officers to conduct thorough and effective investigations of crimi-
nal activity.... Moreover, it was evident to us that the exclusionary
rule, though seldom invoked, serves as an incentive for many police
officers to follow the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment as de-
fined in their jurisdiction. 72
The Van Duizend study raised important questions about the
use of search warrants. Yet, it also issued methodological cautions
that make general acceptance of the results somewhat problematic:
The archival data were used principally to facilitate the exploration of
significant patterns or the conspicuous absence of certain events (e.g.,
successful suppression motions), and to be modestly demonstrative of
overarching patterns. Owing to the fact that the cities used in this
study are not necessarily representative of all cities and that the cases
included in each city sample were not selected in strictly random fash-
ion, statistical reliability of the archival data is not claimed.73
At six of seven sites, sixty-five to seventy-five search warrant applica-
tions were selected by the researchers on an ad hoc basis rather than
through a systematic sampling procedure. This case selection bias
leads to serious problems of interpretation. Another problem in-
volves the unit of analysis. Because the primary concern was to ex-
amine search warrant applications, the researchers did not focus on
individuals or their cases. For example, in the one intensively ex-
amined site, River City, 405 search warrant applications were ex-
amined, but a careful analysis of the persons involved in the cases
was not conducted.
As the Van Duizend study neared completion, the United States
Supreme Court released its decisions in Leon and Sheppard. The NIJ
then commissioned the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) to
conduct an impact study.74 In that project (conducted by the au-
thors of this Article), the researchers used the same seven jurisdic-
tions as the Van Duizend study and also conducted an intensive
review of search warrant practices. The primary concern was the
degree of change in such practices since the Leon decision. 75 Over-
all, the study found that the search warrant process did not change
in the seven sites and across the country; that the number and con-
72 Id. at 119.
73 Id. at 10.
74 See C. UCHIDA, T. BYNUM, D. ROGAN & D. MuRAsKY, THE EFFECTS OF UNITED
STATES V. LEON ON POLICE SEARCH WARRANT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, FINAL REPORT
(monograph prepared for Police Executive Research Forum 1986); see also Uchida,
Bynum, Rogan & Murasky, Acting in Good Faith: The Effects of United States v. Leon on Search
Warrant Policies and Practices, 30 ARiz. L. REV. 467 (1988).
75 We examined search warrant applications prior to and after Leon.
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tent of warrants did not change from 1984 to 1985; and that the
impact on judicial suppression of evidence was virtually non-exis-
tent. Because the focus of the study was the impact of the Leon rul-
ing, the researchers did not carefully examine the cost of the
exclusionary rule on search warrant activity. Like the Van Duizend
et al. work before it, individual defendants and important research
questions were all but ignored.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
Using the data from the Leon study, we now examine the follow-
ing questions: Under what situations and circumstances are search
warrants used? What are the outcomes? How often are motions to
suppress physical evidence made by defendants? What is the suc-
cess rate of the motions and what are the outcomes?
To answer these questions, we developed a research process
that enabled us to focus on both the aggregate cost of the exclusion-
ary rule and the rationale of the individual "lost" cases.
Unlike a number of previous empirical research efforts, we ex-
amined cases that resulted from search warrant applications. Our
data included all search warrant applications for six months of 1984
and 1985 in seven sites (January through March of each year).
Second, most studies of the impact of the exclusionary rule
only note whether a case was excluded and do not include any in-
formation regarding the seriousness of the violation itself. For ex-
ample, we need to know why the exclusion occurred. A simple
empirical tally of cases excluded tells us little of the police search
process or the reasons behind a "lost case." Our purpose is to de-
scribe the "lost case" and to examine the rationale behind its
exclusion.
Third, we distinguish this Article from Van Duizend et al. and
our own previous work by focusing on individual cases and by
avoiding case selection bias through the inclusion of all warrants in
each of the seven sites for a six-month period.
A. THE SITES
We returned to the seven sites previously used in the Van Du-
izend et al. study in 1985. We agreed to allow the seven intensively
studied sites anonymity. 76 They are referred to as Border City, For-
76 While we recognize that the study is weakened somewhat by making these sites
anonymous, the trade-off was not to conduct research in these settings at all. While
members of four departments did not indicate a problem with disclosure, the others did,
and we respect their decisions. We were given complete access to police and court
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est City, Harbor City, Hill City, Mountain City, Plains City, and
River City.
Border City, located in the western United States, is a large ur-
ban center with a diverse population. Forest City is characterized as
a commercial center on the west coast, while Harbor City is a major
eastern industrial city. Hill City is part of a large metropolitan area
in the west. Mountain City, Plains City, and River City are the larg-
est cities in their respective states, and serve as hubs of commercial
activities.
Table 1 provides a comparison of the project sites regarding
population and crime characteristics. In Table 1, we note the rela-
tive independence of city size, crime rate, and size of police force.
Although Plains City, River City, and Border City all have similarly-
sized police departments, they have widely different crime rates and
populations. Interestingly, the smaller cities appear to have the
higher rates of reported crime while the larger cities have among
the lower rates of crime.
Table 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECT SITES
Geographic Index Crime Number of
Site Location Population' Rate2  Sworn Officers'
Border City West 1,000,000 75 1500
Harbor City Northeast 750,000 85 3000
River City South 500,000 85 1500
Plains City Midwest 500,000 105 1500
Forest City Northwest 500,000 130 1000
Hill City West 350,000 120 600
Mountain City West 175,000 115 350
Source: FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1985 (1986).
'1985 estimate based on UCR.
2Rate is per 1,000 people.3Numbers are based on 1985 estimate from UCR.
B. THE DATA
The data analyzed in this article were collected in 1985 and
1986. The principal data collection strategy consisted of an intense,
in-depth study of search warrant activity in seven cities located
throughout the country. In addition, interviews with key personnel
throughout each criminal justice system were undertaken (N= 187).
records and files, and personnel were willing to provide open interviews knowing that
their statements would be held in confidence. As a result, we believe that the data we
obtained are highly reliable and valid.
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At each site, we reviewed all search warrant applications made
during two three-month periods in 1984 and 1985. These applica-
tions were then tracked through the criminal justice system to their
disposition, thus yielding a complete picture of warrant activity in
these jurisdictions. A total of 2,115 warrant applications were ex-
amined, coded, keypunched, and analyzed. From these search war-
rants and the tracking of individual cases in each of the seven
criminal justice systems, we were able to determine whether arrests
occurred, cases were filed, motions were made, how courts ruled on
motions, and the outcomes of the cases.
For this Article, we use two units of analysis-the primary war-
rant and the individual suspect. Primary search warrants are a sub-
set of the total number of actual search warrant applications.
Primary warrants were used because law enforcement officers, at
times, wrote multiple warrants for the same case. On a number of
occasions, officers were required to search more than one person,
place, or vehicle. As a result, a number of search warrant applica-
tions were linked to the same case. When multiple warrants were
related to one investigation, a "primary" warrant was selected to
avoid overcounting and misrepresentation of warrant activity.7 7
To examine the effects of the exclusionary rule on individual
cases, we used the individual suspect, arrestee, and defendant as our
baseline. To determine how policies and practices regarding search
warrants, motions to suppress, and lost cases were dealt with, we
relied on information garnered through structured interviews with
key personnel at each location. Police, prosecutors, defense attor-
neys, and judges were among those interviewed.
V. FINDINGS
A. SEARCH WARRANT ACTIVITY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Table 2 shows the warrant-based case flow or pipeline in each
of the seven sites for the six month period of 1984 and 1985. As we
discussed above, the unit of analysis is the "primary search war-
77 Primary warrants were selected by the two Principal Investigators based on the
warrant applications and affidavits. Where two or more warrant applications applied to
the same individual, house, or vehicle, we examined both warrants or multiple warrants
carefully, prior to coding information. All of the primary warrants were identical to the
"secondary" or "tertiary warrants," except for the place to be searched. That is, the
statements of probable cause, the type of informant, the officers writing the warrants,
and the judges who signed the warrants were identical. This was a commonality among
all sites. All warrants were coded and keypunched with the ability to determine during
the data analysis how warrants might be linked to each other. This allowed us to validate




PIPELINE OF SEARCH WARRANT ACTIVITY, SEVEN SITES
JANUARY TO MARCH, 1984 & 1985
(NUMBER OF WARRANTS & PERCENT OF PRIMARY WARRANTS)
River Mount Plains Border Hill Forest Harbor Totals
Total Warrants 234 85 300 310 254 208 724 2,115
Primary Warrants 191 70 264 265 233 182 543 1,748
Executed Warrants 141 68 253 234 198 176 511 1,511
74% 97% 96% 88% 85% 97% 94% 86%
Warrants with at least
I arrest 131 55 219 173 133 122 325 1,158
69% 79% 83% 65% 57% 67% 60% 66%
Warrants with at least
I case filed by D.A. 93 41 170 150 88 82 315 939
49% 59% 64% 57% 38% 45% 58% 54%
Warrants with at least
I motion to suppress 55 4 29 11 43 24 59 225
29% 6% 11% 4% 18% 13% 11% 13%
Warrants with at least
1 successful motion
to suppress 5 0 5 0 0 3 2 15
3% - 2% - - 2% .4% .9%
rant." Percentages within each of the columns are based on the
number of primary warrants rather than the total number of war-
rants. For example, in River City, police officers wrote 234 total
warrants, but conducted only 191 unique investigations (primary
warrants), so these 191 primary warrants were used as the baseline.
Harbor City police officers wrote the highest number of warrant
applications during this period, followed by officers in Border and
Plains Cities. On average, 86% of all primary warrants were exe-
cuted or served, ranging from a low of 74% in River City to a high
of 97% in Mountain City. Similarly, warrant-based investigations
led to an arrest almost two-thirds of the time, with Plains City of-
ficers (83%) making the most arrests. Offices of the district attorney
filed cases in almost 54% of the warrants. The relatively low per-
centages of cases filed in Hill City (38%), Forest City (45%), and
River City (49%) reflect the stringency of review and screening con-
ducted in each of the offices of the district attorney.
Table 2 also shows the number and percentage of primary
search warrants that were contested through motions to suppress.
Overall, 225 primary warrants (13%) were contested by defendants.
River City had the highest percentage of warrants challenged
(29%), followed by Hill City (18%) and Forest City (13%). These
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motions were granted in 15 primary warrants (0.9%) and in only
four of the seven sites (River City, Plains City, Forest City, and Har-
bor City).
Table 3 describes the overall situation further, by detailing indi-
vidual-level information. Within the 1,748 primary warrants, police
detained or arrested 2,276 total suspects. Of these, 1,672 were for-
mally arrested by police and 1,355 (or 81%) became defendants
(charged by the district attorney). Charging practices differed
across sites. Harbor City, Mountain City, and Border City prosecu-
tors accepted over 90% of the cases brought to their attention via
arrest. Plains City, Forest City, Hill City, and River City district at-
torneys accepted fewer than 76% of the cases. Unfortunately, we do
not know how many times prosecutors refused to file charges be-
cause there was a "bad" or faulty warrant, as opposed to other rea-
sons for not prosecuting. Thus, we cannot assess the loss of
arrestees where cases were never filed.
Table 3
PIPELINE OF SUSPECTS, ARRESTEES, AND DEFENDANTS
SEVEN SITES
Total River Mount Plains Border Hill Forest Harbor
# Suspects 2276 303 94 317 352 301 240 669
# Arrestees 1672 253 65 270 254 200 180 450
# Defendants 1355 155 63 204 234 128 132 439
Defendants as 7 of Arrestees 81.0 61.3 96.9 75.6 92.1 64.0 73.3 97.6
Defendants as 7 of Suspects 59.5 51.2 67.0 64.4 66.5 42.5 55.0 65.6
In terms of dispositions of search warrant-based cases, on aver-
age, 70% of the defendants were convicted of their crimes (Table
4). Mountain City and Forest City prosecutors convicted 82% and
81% of their defendants, respectively. Hill City and Harbor City
had lower conviction rates (59% and 62%, respectively) and higher
dismissal rates (29% and 24%) than the other cities. Acquittals by
jury trial or bench trial averaged 3% across the sites, ranging from a
low of 1% in Hill City to a high of 5% in River City.
In general, search warrant cases were subject to the exclusion-
ary rule if the warrant did not meet the legal standard of probable
cause. Supreme Court decisions in Gates,78 Leon,79 and Sheppard80
provided the police with less rigid requirements to follow and more
78 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
79 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
80 468 U.S. 981 (1984).




Total River Mount Plains Border Hill Forest Harbor
# Defendants 1355 155 63 204 234 128 132 439
# Convicted' 839 113 45 127 155 57 80 262
70% 75% 82% 75% 76% 59% 81% 62%
# Dismissed 238 25 8 32 28 28 17 100
20% 17% 15% 19% 14% 29% 17% 24%
#Acquitted 38 8 2 6 5 1 2 14
3% 5% 4% 4% 2% 1% 2% 3%
# Otherb 78 3 0 5 16 10 0 44
7% 2% - 3% 8% 10% - 10%
Missing cases 135 4 8 34 30 32 33 19
'includes those who pled guilty and those found guilty through trial
b includes defendants who were diverted for treatment or received a pre-trial
"sentence" (e.g., probation before judgement in Harbor City)
incentives to seek more warrants. For example, in Gates, the Court
established the "totality-of-circumstances" test, which directed the
magistrate to "make a practical common-sense decision whether
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit... [that] there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place."81 Prior to Gates, police were required
to describe both how the informant learned where the items were
located and a basis for believing that the informant was credible or
the information supplied was reliable.82 Nonetheless, law enforce-
ment officers are still required to provide the basis for using infor-
mants (i.e., whether anonymous or confidential) within their
warrants. In our interviews, police detectives and patrol officers in-
dicated that they still followed the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar-
Spinelli because it was well-defined and they were accustomed to
writing warrants that laid out specific needs.
Leon and Sheppard theoretically provide police officers with ad-
ded incentives to secure warrants. These incentives stem from the
Court's ruling that evidence seized during a search conducted in ob-
jective, good-faith reliance on a warrant will be admitted at trial,
even if the warrant is later found to be defective. Yet, even with the
protection from subsequent motions to suppress, warrant activity
did not increase; nor was Leon raised by prosecutors or judges when
81 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
82 See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Aguilar-Spinelli two-
pronged test.
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warrants were questioned post-Leon.8 3
To meet the probable cause standard in search warrants, law
enforcement officers at each site recognized that they needed to fol-
low certain procedural and substantive guidelines set by their re-
spective state supreme courts as well as the United States Supreme
Court. While these guidelines varied by site on specific dimensions,
they were generalizable to a certain extent. For example, the war-
rant application usually consisted of two items: first, the formal
search warrant, which had to be signed by a magistrate or judge and
had to indicate the person, place, or vehicle to be searched and the
types of items to be seized; and second, the affidavit, which provided
more detailed support of the search warrant.
In preparing the affidavit, law enforcement officers provided in-
formation that established their credibility and veracity to the court.
Officers included information about their background, the steps
taken in the investigation, a description of the person or place to be
searched and the items to be seized, and if necessary, information
provided by informants.
Confidential informants were used over half of the time in Har-
bor, Hill and Border Cities, but less than a quarter of the time in
Forest, Plains, and Mountain Cities. Table 5 shows the level of use
Table 5
USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS, SEVEN SITES
JANUARY TO MARCH, 1984 & 1985
River Mount Plains Border Hill Forest Harbor
Primary Warrants 191 70 264 265 233 182 543
# Warrants with CI 90 12 67 141 140 42 326
Crime corroborated? 72 11 56 124 65 1 263
80% 92% 84% 88% 46% 2% 81%
Site corroborated? 77 11 66 124 64 28 299
86% 92% 99% 88% 46% 67% 92%
Material Seized 64 12 63 103 106 39 281
71% 100% 94% 73% 76% 93% 86%
Arrest Made? 73 9 53 76 79 32 203
81% 75% 79% 54% 56% 76% 62%
Case Filed? 56 9 37 69 49 19 198
62% 75% 55% 49% 35% 45% 61%
of confidential informants (CIs) by site. Using the number of war-
rants with a CI as the unit of analysis, the data indicate that the
quantity and quality of material within the affidavit varied by site and
83 Uchida, Bynum, Rogan & Murasky, supra note 74, at 494.
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by agency. In Forest City, police almost never corroborated infor-
mation regarding the type of crime. Hill City officers did so less
than 50% of the time, whereas, in the remaining five sites corrobo-
ration of the crime occurred in over 80% of the warrants using in-
formants. The use of CIs, the levels of corroboration of the crime,
and the location of the crime varied across the jurisdictions.
The outcomes of informant-based warrants also varied, but less
dramatically than the corroboration of crime element. In Forest
City, where crimes were least likely to be corroborated, an arrest
took place in 93% of the warrants with CIs. At the same time, how-
ever, prosecutors were willing to file cases in only nineteen of thirty-
two arrests (59%). In contrast, in Harbor City, officers made arrests
in 203 of 326 warrants with CIs (62%) and prosecutors filed cases in
198 of the 203 arrests (98%).
In two jurisdictions, Border City and Mountain City, officers
used standardized forms for their affidavits. In Border City, a dis-
trict attorney developed five such forms, one each for homicide, nar-
cotics, sex offenses, burglary, and auto theft. For the most part,
these were "fill-in-the-blank" affidavits. Police simply filled in infor-
mation about their background (e.g., "I am a peace officer currently
assigned to the - division and have been so assigned for
years"); the confidential informant (e.g., "I have known the CI for
about -"); the items to be seized; and the person or location to be
searched.
In Mountain City, a detective developed a form that allowed
officers not only to fill-in-the-blanks, but also provided a check-list
for the evidence to be seized and the reliability of the confidential
informant. Police in that jurisdiction explained that these standard-
ized forms helped them to be more efficient and precise than is pos-
sible when writing new affidavits on each occasion. While some
judges we interviewed expressed concern over the use of such forms
because of problems in determining the truthfulness of the affida-
vits, others said that they were no different from the standardized
language in affidavits generally. Furthermore, motions to suppress
evidence based on a standardized form never appeared in any of the
jurisdictions under scrutiny.
To ensure further that probable cause was established, in two
sites, Plains and Border Cities, a member of the district attorney's
staff reviewed and approved search warrant applications before they
were submitted to a judge or magistrate. This arrangement was
supported by formal agreements between the prosecutor's office
and the police department, and by the twenty-four hour-a-day avail-
ability of a designated attorney. These full-time district attorney li-
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aisons, whose offices were located within police headquarters, not
only screened but also signed the warrant applications. Our inter-
views with police indicated that these district attorney liaisons pro-
vided assistance in determining probable cause and gave them
confidence that evidence seized as a result of the warrant would not
be suppressed at trial. In both sites, the police were enthusiastic
about the support provided by the district attorney's offices.
In the other sites, a prosecutor was available to review a warrant
application if desired by the officer. In Forest City, for example, the
district attorney's office actively encouraged the police department
to have its warrants reviewed by an assistant prosecutor. Moreover,
if an assistant approved a warrant application, then it was the policy
of the prosecutor's office to defend it in court from any challenges
that may arise and to prosecute the case more vigorously. In con-
trast, in River City, we found that the police and prosecutor's office
had very little contact regarding search warrants. In fact, police said
that they seldom, if ever, asked the prosecutor's office for assistance.
In Mountain City, the police viewed district attorney input as
"unnecessary." On occasion, however, an investigator would call
the prosecutor's office for a cursory review. When they did call an
attorney, detectives admitted to "attorney shopping;" that is, con-
tacting a prosecutor whom they know would be less stringent in his
or her review. In Hill City, where official departmental policy dic-
tated that detectives call the district attorney's office for assistance
and approval, detectives readily admitted that doing so "slowed the
process" and did not follow that policy.
Once an internal and/or external review was completed, the of-
ficer usually presented a judge with the warrant and affidavit. The
judge examined the documents and sometimes questioned the of-
ficer. Some police officers said that judges took, on average, about
fifteen minutes to review the application. Others said that judges
would spend five to thirty minutes reviewing a warrant, depending
upon the length of the affidavit and also whether the judge knew the
officer personally. Familiarity with the law enforcement officer sped
up the process. According to officers in Harbor City, the credibility
of the individual officer was of central importance to judicial review.
They noted that it was imperative that the detective establish him-
self or herself as having credibility and reliability in court. Providing
the judge with positive feedback about the execution of the warrant
as well as being consistent and honest in situations not affiliated
with warrant activity (e.g., as a witness in a court case) established a
"good" reputation with judges. In so doing, the police were confi-
dent that warrants would be approved.
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In almost all of the applications, the judge, upon his or her de-
termination of probable cause, signed the warrants. In only one in-
stance did we find a rejected warrant application (out of 1,748
warrants). Rejected applications usually were either destroyed or
revised by the police, and thus were not available for scrutiny. How-
ever, in Border City, where telephonic warrant applications are
used, a transcript of one rejected warrant was on file.
Once the warrant was approved by a judge, the police had three
to ten days to execute it. In most jurisdictions warrants were served
within a day or two, but in Border City, detectives often waited the
full length of time (ten days in this case) before serving the warrant.
After executing the warrant, the officer had another ten days to file a
"return" with the court. The return indicates whether the warrant
was executed, the date and time of the execution, and an inventory
of the items seized. In six of seven intensively studied jurisdictions,
returns were filed regularly by the police. In River City, however,
returns were often missing, resulting in problems for tracking cases.
Following the execution and filing of a search warrant, police
often reported that arrests were usually made and criminal cases
filed. According to our data, however, on average, only 54%o of the
primary warrants were actually filed for prosecution.
Once an individual was charged, the case fell within the guide-
lines of the criminal justice system. Arraignments, preliminary hear-
ings, motion hearings, plea bargaining, trials (if necessary), and
sentencing were conducted by the courts.
B. MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
At least one motion to suppress physical evidence was filed in
13% of all primary warrants.84 River City defense attorneys filed
motions in 29% of the primary warrants. Border City and Mountain
City defendants were least likely to file motions, with Hill, Forest,
Plains, and Harbor Cities falling within the ten and twenty percen-
tiles (see to Table 2).
Motions to suppress physical evidence were raised as early as
the preliminary hearing in most jurisdictions. These motions
ranged from lengthy, detailed explanations to one-page "boiler
plate" forms signed by a defense attorney. They also varied across
and within jurisdictions. In River City, where defendants filed mo-
tions to suppress 57%y of the time (Table 6), the motion itself was
often only three paragraphs long, noting the name of the defendant,
84 This figure is considerably lower than the 40% found by Van Duizend, supra note
71. This shows the selection bias within the Van Duizend study.
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the grounds for the motion, and a request that an evidentiary hear-
ing take place. At the evidentiary hearing, arguments would be
raised by both the prosecution and defense counsel, and the judge
would make a determination.
Table 6
DEFENDANTS AND MOTIONS TO SuPPRESS
SEVEN SUTS
Total River Mount Plains Border Hill Forest Harbor
# Defendants 1355 155 63 204 234 128 132 439
# Defendants Who
File MTS 317 88 7 35 14 57 37 79
7 Defendants Who
File MTS 23.4 56.8 11.1 17.2 6.0 44.5 28.0 18.0
# Defendants w/MTS
Granted 27 12 0 7 0 0 6 2
7 Granted
(Defendants as base) 2.0 7.7 0 3.4 0 0 4.5 0.5
7 Granted
(Motions filed as base) 8.5 13.6 0 20.0 0 0 16.2 2.5
Mountain and Border Cities had the least amount of activity
with regard to motions to suppress physical evidence. In Mountain
City, defense attorneys claimed that trial court judges "always up-
held searches regardless of what errors or lack of probable cause
were found." As a result, members of the defense bar rarely made
search and seizure an issue. The district attorney agreed with this
attitude and further claimed that the judicial climate and legal com-
munity were "quite conservative." By this, he meant that both the
prosecutors and defense attorneys were conservative in their polit-
ical beliefs and presumed that search warrants were valid. In Moun-
tain City, four warrants were challenged by seven defendants; two
involved burglaries and two involved drugs. All seven defendants
were denied their motions to suppress.
In Border City, the work of a district attorney liaison virtually
assured that warrants would not be questioned regarding the prob-
able cause standard. The district attorney liaison, permanently as-
signed to the police department, assisted the police by writing and
processing warrants himself, thus reducing the likelihood of suc-
cessful motions.8 5 Defense attorneys were aware of this involve-
85 Officers would seek assistance from the district attorney liaison as an investigation
unfolded. Once the need for a warrant was immediately apparent, the liaison and police
officers would sit down together and write the warrant. The district attorney liaison
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ment and were not likely to file motions to suppress (only 6% of the
defendants file), which the judges, in turn, did not sustain.
Plains City, Forest City, and Hill City defense attorneys wrote
lengthier, detailed briefs describing the reasons for the motions. At
these sites, a number of motions cited a lack of probable cause in
the warrant either because the police did not adequately corrobo-
rate the information provided by anonymous or confidential infor-
mants or because the "totality-of-circumstances" as articulated by
the Gates decision was not met. A Hill City public defender related
that he filed motions if he could "determine that the judge was mis-
led or somehow deceived by the police officer in the written affidavit
and/or if there was an inadequate description of the items to be
seized."
In Hill City, the public defender's office was particularly active
in filing motions to suppress physical evidence-defendants filed
motions 45% of the time. However, judges did not grant the exclu-
sion of the evidence in any of the cases. In Plains and Forest Cities,
motions were successful on seven and six occasions, respectively.
To obtain an idea of the characteristics of the cases in which a
motion to suppress evidence was made, the incidence of motions
was examined by type of offense. Table 7 shows that motions were
Table 7
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS BY TYPE OF OFFENSE
SEVEN SITES
% of cases involving motions to suppress physical evidence
Offense Type River Mount Plains Border Hill Forest Harbor
Violent Crime 4.5 0 4.0 0.4 2.3 8.9 1.6
Property Crime 1.3 3.2 1.5 0.4 0 4.9 1.6
Drug Offense 31.6 3.2 7.4 1.3 32.0 13.0 9.8
Other 18.1 3.2 3.4 3.8 5.5 3.3 4.6
N=155 N=63 N=204 N=234 N=128 N=132 N=439
filed most often in drug offensess 6 in six of the seven sites. The lone
exception is Border City, where motions were more likely to be filed
would use a word processor with "boiler plate" language to assist in writing the warrant.
Plains City, which also had district attorney review, did not achieve similar results.
However, in Plains City, the assistance of the district attorney liaison was less direct.
Here, the police would seek advice after they had written the warrants themselves. The
liaison would review the warrant for probable cause and then recommend changes or
give approval through his or her signature.
86 Drug offenses included both felonies and misdemeanors and involved possession




C. SUCCESSFUL MOTIONS AND CASE DISPOSITIONS
Motions to suppress were successful in only 0.9% of the pri-
mary warrants (15 of 1,748).81 On an individual level, judges sus-
tained motions for twenty-seven defendants, or 2% of all
defendants. These figures varied across sites. In three locations,
Mountain, Border, and Hill Cities, no motions were successful.
River City had the most successes (twelve defendants), followed by
Plains (seven), Forest (six) and Harbor Cities (two).
Table 8 provides a breakdown of the primary warrants, the de-
fendant or co-defendant, the charges made by the prosecutor, and
the dispositions of the defendants who were successful in sup-
pressing evidence seized by police in four sites. As can be seen from
the table, twenty-seven defendants were involved in the fifteen pri-
mary warrant cases.
In River City, twelve defendants successfully challenged the
search warrants: five defendants were charged with obscenity;8 9
five defendants were cdarged with possession of marijuana; and two
were accused of fencing less than $25 worth of stolen property. The
court dismissed eleven of the twelve cases as a result of the suppres-
sion of evidence. One individual was found guilty of possessing ma-
rijuana. His sentence included a fine of $500 and three years
probation.
In Plains City, five defendants charged with cocaine possession
in three separate cases (#134, #160, and #300) and two robbery
defendants (cases #163 and #254) were successful in suppressing
evidence. In case # 134, involving three defendants, the defense
counsel argued that the totality-of-circumstances test had not been
fulfilled and that the information from a first-time confidential in-
formant was not corroborated by police. The counsel also claimed
that even under Leon, the good faith doctrine did not apply because
of the reckless preparation of the warrant and the absence of a basis
for an objective believe that probable cause existed. The judge
agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case. In the two re-
maining cases of cocaine possession, the defendants successfully
87 "Other" crimes included firearms possession, gambling, pornography, petty larce-
nies, and the like.
88 In contrast, Van Duizend, supra note 71, found that motions to suppress were
granted in 17 of 350 search warrant cases (5%).
89 In case #89, three defendants were charged with producing a pornographic
movie, while in case #227, two defendants were accused of operating a movie house































































































filed suppression motions based on a lack of corroboration of evi-
dence provided by the confidential informant.
In the two warrants that were robbery-related (#163 and
#254), even though the evidence seized was not allowed, because
of lack of corroboration of the informants, eyewitness testimony and
co-conspirator statements led the defendants to plead guilty.
In Forest City, the defendants who succeeded were all involved
in marijuana "grow farms." Police had sought warrants for resi-
dences where defendants were allegedly growing marijuana in their
basements. In cases resulting from primary warrants #34 and #65,
judges ruled that the information obtained by police through confi-
dential informants did not meet the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged
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test.90 In case #80, the search warrant was not signed by a "neutral
and detached magistrate" but by a judge pro tempore, who did not
have the authority to issue a warrant. Four of the six defendants in
these three distinct cases were released outright, while the other two
(case #65) had their cases pending at the time of the data
collection.
In Harbor City, two defendants succeeded in suppressing the
evidence seized in two separate search warrant raids. A judge re-
leased one defendant (case #45, which involved a marijuana pos-
session charge) after determining that the information from a CI
was not sufficiently corroborated. The second defendant (case
#529) pled guilty to a burglary charge despite having the evidence
suppressed, for reasons not recorded by the court.
D. "LOST CASES"
Lost cases are those in which the court granted a motion to sup-
press and dismissed the case. Based on this definition, nineteen in-
dividual defendants were allowed "to go free" based on an
exclusionary rule problem. This represents 1.4% of all defendants
in our sample of search warrant-based cases (n= 1,355). If we add
the two acquittals from River City case #217, then the percentage
increases to 1.5%.
Table 9 shows the numbers and percentages of lost cases by
site. River City has the highest number of lost cases (eleven) and
the leading percentage based on defendants (7.1%). Plains City has
the highest percentage of successful defendants based on those who
file a motion to suppress (20%).
In most of these "lost cases," the trial court judge determined
that a police officer had not been able to properly establish probable
cause. In one instance, the court ruled that a judge pro tempore was
not a "neutral and detached magistrate" and thus did not have the
authority to sign a warrant. Despite the ruling in Leon, which al-
lowed for the good faith exception in search warrant situations,
judges were willing to suppress the use of such evidence. "Techni-
calities," such as the lack of an inventory, or "return" sheet, were
not part of the motions to suppress, nor were they incorporated into
any decisions by judges.
90 In this jurisdiction, the state supreme court had not yet incorporated Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). As a result, the Aguilar-Spineli two-pronged test controlled






River Mount Plains Border Hill Forest Harbor
Number of Lost Cases 113  0 5 0 0 4 1
As 7o of defendants 7.1 0 2.5 0 0 3.3 0.2
As %5 of defendants
who filed motions 12.5 0 20.0 0 0 10.8 1.3
As 7o of successful
motions to suppress 91.7 0 71.4 0 0 66.7 50.0
a Includes 2 acquittals
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has shown that motions to suppress were success-
ful in only 0.9% of the primary warrants (15 of 1,748). Judges sus-
tained motions for 2% of all defendants (27 of 1,355) in our
warrant-based sample. Few cases were "lost" as a result of the ex-
clusionary rule in seven jurisdictions when police used search war-
rants. Twenty-one of 1,355 defendants (1.5%) were "allowed to go
free" as a result of a successful motion to suppress physical evi-
dence. The most serious offenders who were released were those
charged with possession of cocaine, a felony in Plains City. Others
with successful motions were charged with obscenity (operating a
pornographic movie house or producing a pornographic movie),
fencing less than $25 worth of stolen property, and possessing less
than an ounce of marijuana-clearly not major crimes.
Our results are consistent with the findings reported by
Nardulli, Davies (in his re-analysis of the NIJ data), and the GAO
Report. Nardulli indicated that motions were filed in about 5% of
the 7,500 cases he studied, and were granted in 52 cases (or 0.7% of
all cases). He also reported that convictions still occurred in some
of these cases and that only 40 (of the 52) ended in nonconviction;
accordingly, only 0.6% of all cases appeared to be "lost" because of
the exclusionary rule. In addition, he reported that 80% of the lost
cases involved non-serious crimes: 37% were drug related, 22% in-
volved possession of a weapon, and 24% were for miscellaneous
non-violent offenses. Similarly, the GAO Report found that 0.8% of
arrests were lost because of illegal searches,9 1 while Davies found a
"cumulative loss" of 2.35% of arrests in his analysis of the NIJ Re-




port's California data. Our figure of 1.5% lost cases falls within the
range of the Nardulli study (0.6%) and the Davies re-analysis
(2.35%). Note, however, that our data reflect only search warrant
based cases, not all cases filed within the jurisdictions.
We found other important results within the sites:
(1) In three of seven sites-Mountain, Hill, and Border Cities--de-
fendants were not successful in their challenges to evidence seized
by police as a result of search warrants.
(2) In Border City, the work of a district attorney liaison in writing
search warrants with police officers reduced the chances that war-
rant-based evidence would be suppressed at trial.
(3) In Harbor City, we found that police were accomplished at writing
warrant applications and conducted high quality investigations.
As a result, only two motions were successful and only one case
"lost" out of 439 search warrant applications during the six-month
period of the study.
(4) Though Plains City officers worked with a district attorney liaison
to meet the standards of the state courts, defendants had the high-
est percentage of successful motions to suppress (seven out of
thirty-five, or 20%).
(5) River City's law enforcement and criminal justice communities
were not aligned when it came to search warrants and the exclu-
sionary rule. A poor and often antagonistic relationship existed
between the police and the prosecutor. The police did not seek
assistance in writing warrants. In our interviews, we found that
police accused the district attorney's office of not prosecuting
enough cases, while the district attorney accused the police of
poor investigations. Defense attorneys filed a large number of
motions to suppress (577 of defendants filed). Fourteen percent
of those filing motions (or 8% of defendants) were successful in
suppressing evidence. Of the twelve defendants who won, eleven
were freed. At the same time, however, River City still maintained
a high percentage of convictions (75% of defendants within our
sample).
Given these findings, it is not surprising that we agree with the
Van Duizend et al. conclusion that search warrants provide "clear
and tangible records that facilitate post hoc evaluation of the original
search."'92 We also agree with their finding that the "exclusionary
rule, though seldom invoked, serves as an incentive for many police
officers to follow the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment as
defined in theirjurisdiction. ' 93 Our interviews indicated that police
were willing to follow guidelines established by the Constitution,
the district attorney's office, and the courts when writing search war-
rant applications. The willingness of officers in Border, Plains, and
92 Van Duizend, supra note 71, at 106.
93 Id. at 119.
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Forest Cities to have warrants reviewed by prosecutors was a re-
sponse, in part, to the exclusionary sanction. Police wanted to in-
sure that warrants met the standards of probable cause and that
evidence seized would not be later suppressed.
Our study also provides further evidence that the "cost" of the
exclusionary rule in lost cases is slight when the police obtain a
search warrant. While critics of the exclusionary rule argue that it
imposes a high cost on society by depriving the courts of reliable
evidence and allowing criminals freedom, we have found that, in
fact, few criminals are freed, and when they are, their crimes are not
serious. Thus, the cost to society is limited.
